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The City of Moab, through counsel, submits the following Reply Brief in
Support of this appeal.
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I. ARGUMENT
1.

OWNERS INCORRECTLY ASSERT THAT REVIEW OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION OBVIATES REVIEW OF THE
TRIAL COURT DECISION.
Both parties agree that this is an appeal of an adjudicatory proceeding, and

that the decision of the land use authority is valid if supported by substantial
evidence, and not otherwise arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. Response Brief, p.
19. But, Owners contend that the City incorrectly applies the standard of review
by attacking the order of the trial court, and that any error by the trial court is
rendered “harmless” because this Court must review the City Council decision
without according any deference to the trial court judgment. Id. at 20.
The City agrees that this Court need not accord the trial court decision any
presumption of correctness. See, Save our Canyons v. Board of Adjustment of Salt
Lake County, 116 P.3d 978, 982-983 (Utah App. 2005). With respect to the
assertion that any error by the trial court was harmless in light of the standard of
review, the Owners fail to cite any legal authority to support this dubious
proposition. Lack of deference to a trial court judgment does not mean that the
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appellate court must ignore the trial court decision1. The argument does not even
make logical sense in that, if accepted, no appellate court in an appeal of
administrative action could ever address erroneous rulings of law by a trial court.
This appeal centers on a reversal on the merits of a municipal decision as land use
authority. The errors in this case were adopted by the trial court at the urging of
the Owners. This Court has jurisdiction to reverse any error of law in the
proceeding subject to review. See U.C.A. § 78A-4-103(1)(a)(jurisdiction to carry
into effect all of the Court of Appeals’ judgments or orders). Necessarily, this
requires review of the trial court decision.
2.

ALL POINTS OF ERROR WERE PRESERVED FOR REVIEW.
The City asserts four points of error. Opening Brief, pp. 1-2. In their

Response Brief the Owners do not allege any failure to preserve these issues,
stating instead that the issued are not subject to the preservation rule. Response
Brief, p. 2. Accordingly, there is no dispute that all issues advanced by the City
were preserved.

The Owners’ argument is a tacit admission that the trial court judgment is
erroneous, though Owners characterize that decision as “harmless.” Response
Brief, p. 20.
1

2

3.

DENIAL OF THE PERMIT BASED ON THE INCONSISTENCY OF
THE APPLICATION WITH THE MOAB GENERAL PLAN IS
RATIONAL, AND CONSISTENT WITH THE LEGITIMATE LAND
USE POWERS OF THE CITY.
The City contends that the denial of the conditional use permit in this case

was rational and appropriate because the proposed use runs contrary to provisions
in the City’s General Plan, which discourage the expansion of commercial uses in
residential neighborhoods. In response, the Owners assert that the General Plan is
irrational, and beyond the legitimate powers of the City. Response Brief, p. 28.
This argument was not presented to the City Council, and was therefore not
preserved for review. Pacific West Communities v. Grantsville City, 221 P.3d
280, 286 (Utah App. 2009). In any case, the argument does not hold up under
scrutiny.
a.

Any Facial Challenge to the General Plan is Untimely.

Though the argument is not well defined, Owners appear to attack the
content of the General Plan as unclear and “subjective” as to its terms. Response
Brief, pp. 33-34. Owners rely upon Smith Inv. Co. v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245
(Utah App. 1998), for the proposition that land use restrictions which are irrational
violate the substantive component of the due process clause of the United States
Constitution. While this is a correct recitation of the law, Smith does not support
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the Owners’ claims.
Smith rejected a facial challenge to a rezoning ordinance which abolished a
commercial use in a particular area. To the extent that Owners rely on Smith to
claim that the Moab General Plan is facially invalid, such a claim would be
untimely. See U.C.A. § 10-9a-801(5)(a challenge to the enactment of a general
plan must be brought within 30 days of enactment); Tolman v. Logan City, 167
P.3d 489, 492 (Utah App. 2007)(facial challenge to land use ordinance becomes
ripe for review upon enactment). Here, the General Plan was enacted in May,
2002. See R. 0646 (approval resolution accompanying the General Plan). Any
facial challenge is thus time-barred2.
b.

The General Plan Rationally Advances the Public Welfare.

Second, to the extent that the Owners assert a due process challenge to the
General Plan as applied to their land use application, the Plan easily withstands
such a challenge because it represents a permissible policy choice within the range
of choices that are reasonably debatable, as required for validity of a legislative
enactment. A municipal land use regulation does not violate the substantive
2

Similarly, the Moab conditional use permit ordinance has been on the books for
many years. See R. 0717; 0738 (Editor’s Notes showing dates of conditional use
ordinance enactment). Any facial challenge to the ordinance would also be timebarred, though no such claim has apparently been advanced by the Owners.
4

component of due process unless it lacks a reasonable relation to the public health,
safety, or general welfare. Tolman v. Logan City, 167 P.2d at 495; citing: Smith
Inv. Co. v. Sandy City, 985 P.2d at 252. This Court previously recognized that the
“exclusion of buildings devoted to business, trade, etc. from residential districts
bears a rational relation to the health and safety of the community.” Smith, at 254,
citing: Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 391-393 (1926).
Indeed, protecting children from business uses, promoting quiet residential areas,
and the prevention of congestion, disorder, and traffic are all legitimate municipal
objectives. Id. Zoning regulations which promote the integrity of a
neighborhood and preserve its residential character are related to the general
welfare and, therefore, a valid exercise of municipal authority. Smith at 254-255;
citations omitted.
Here, the Moab General Plan explicitly favors protection of residential
neighborhoods. It announces a goal of promoting “..attractive, stable, and safe
residential areas…” R. 0621. To “implement” that goal, the Plan provides that
the City will “restrict commercial development in residential zones.” Id. The
term “implementation” has meaning within the Plan, as that denotes
“[r]ecommended courses of action to achieve goals in compliance with stated
policies.” R. 0610. Thus, the General Plan includes both a proper subject for the
5

exercise of land use power—the protection of residential neighborhoods, and a
reasonable and specific directive to achieve that goal—restricting the
encroachment commercial uses in areas of zoned for residential development.
Although the Owners contend that it is unknown what portion of the General
Plan was relied upon by the Council in reaching its decision, Response Brief, p. 33,
that statement is belied by the fact that one of the Council members specifically
referred to this provision of the General Plan in the discussion immediately prior to
the Council vote:
“If you look at the general plan as it is right now, one of the five goals
is to restrict commercial development in residential areas, or residential
zones—sorry. And in this specific instance in this zone, I feel like
what we’re being asked to do is to force a commercial business on a
residential area that clearly is not interested in creating a commercial
zone.” R. 0381.
Thus, it is clear in the record that the Council took note of, and relied upon, the
policies and implementation steps recommended in the General Plan, as shown at
R. 0621. These actions were entirely consistent with how the land use process is
designed to work. See Tolman, 167 P.3d at 495 (city acted properly by rezoning
property in a manner consistent with objective in comprehensive plan of preserving
single family housing).
In their brief Owners point to provisions of the General Plan that encourage
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economic development within the City of Moab as contradicting the City’s
decision that the application was inconsistent with the goals of the General Plan.
Response Brief, p. 34. This argument again misses the mark because Owners
cannot point to provisions in the Plan that, for example, would encourage the
expansion of lodging or commercial uses in residentially zoned areas. In fact, the
City of Moab has multiple zoning districts that are open to commercial
development, while such development is constrained in other residential districts.
The fact that the City encourages economic development generally does not mean
that it is appropriate in every location, and the Plan agrees.
Ultimately, Owners cite to multiple provisions in the General Plan that
actually support the City’s decision. Id. at 30 (General Plan notes that growth has
increased land use conflicts; that long-range considerations should apply to land
use decisions); p. 31 (noting a community vision that conflicting land uses are
separated and buffered); p. 32 (noting a goal of minimizing impacts between
transitions in land use); p. 33 (noting that the General Plan provides a basis for the
rejection or modification of land use proposals that clearly conflict with the Plan’s
goals). These provisions clearly buttress the Council decision which, at its core,
rests on the notion that the City policies discourage uses which could create an
unreasonable impact on residential neighborhoods.
7

c.

A Municipality Acts Rationally When it Acts Consistent With its
Comprehensive Plan.

Owners dismiss or attempt to distinguish the authorities cited by the City for
the proposition that a conditional use permit may properly be denied due to lack of
conformity with a comprehensive plan. In doing so, Owners ignore that the City
is required to have a comprehensive plan, per U.C.A. § 10-9a-401; that the plan is
an advisory guide to land use decisions, the import of which may be varied by
ordinance, U.C.A. § 10-9a-405; and that the City of Moab made compliance with
the General Plan a mandatory condition for issuance of a conditional use permit.
MMC § 17.09.530(H)(7); R. 0716. Regardless, conformity of land use decisions
with municipal comprehensive plans is a bedrock principal of land use law, in Utah
and many other states. See Tolman, supra; Krempasky v. Nez Perce County
Planning and Zoning; 245 P.3d 983, 989(Idaho 2010)(county acted properly in
granting conditional use permit where it found the use consistent with
comprehensive plan); Baker v. City of Milwaukie, 533 P.2d 772 (Oregon
1975)(variance granted in violation of comprehensive plan is unlawful); BBY
Investors v. City of Maplewood, 467 N.W.2d 631, 634 (Minn. 1991)(city acted
properly to deny conditional use permit where use was contrary to comprehensive
plan and plan compliance was mandatory). The weight of authority from this
Court and others supports the conclusion that the City of Moab acted properly
8

here3.
4.

TESTIMONY FROM AFFECTED LANDOWNERS CANNOT BE
DISMISSED AS MERE CLAMOR ABSENT SOME ELEMENT OF
IMPROPER PURPOSE OR SERIOUS PROCEDURAL
MISCONDUCT.
In their response the Owners essentially argue that the public opposition to

their application must be dismissed as mere “clamor” and, in the absence of this
clamor, their application must be approved under the ordinance. They argue that
there “is no record evidence to support the adverse public comment” of
neighboring property owners. Response Brief, p. 45. Essentially, they argue that
the testimony of neighboring property owners is incompetent, and must be
excluded, unless confirmed by some other source. In effect, Owners’ formulation
of the public clamor concept argues for an exclusionary rule, one that collides
squarely with constitutionally protected right of neighboring property owners to
speak, and to petition local government for redress of grievances.
A proper application of the “public clamor” doctrine requires that this Court
enunciate a rule premised on respect for the rights of other parties to present
evidence and arguments based on the substantive criteria of a land use ordinance.

3

Additionally, the fact that the Council relied upon the incompatibility of the
application with the General Plan in reaching the decision rebuts the claim urged
by the Owners that the decision was predicated solely on adverse public comment.
9

Properly understood, the Council decision was appropriate in light of this standard.
a.

The Right to Petition the Government for Redress of Grievances
is Fundamental.

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees to
citizens the right to petition the government for redress of grievances. Anderson
Development Co. v. Tobias, 116 P.3d 323, 332 (Utah 2005)(dismissing tort claims
brought against persons who objected to commercial development). Under the socalled Noerr-Pennington doctrine the United States Supreme Court has recognized
that persons engaging in petitioning activity are protected from tort claims and
other forms of retaliation resulting from efforts to influence officials and agencies
of the government. Id. (citations omitted). Indeed, the right to petition and
assemble for redress of grievances are among “the most precious of the liberties
protected by the Bill of Rights.” United Mine Workers America v. Illinois State
Bar, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967). And, the importance of the right to petition has
been repeatedly recognized in the zoning context. Protect our Mountain
Environment v. District Court, 677 P.2d 1361, 1365-1366 (Colo. 1984)(identifying
first amendment related zoning cases).
Given the significance of the interests at stake, it follows that any judicial
rule which has the effect of excluding whole classes of speech from public debate
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based on the identity of the speaker or the content of his/her speech is inherently
suspect. See Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310, 341
(2010). To the extent that the so-called public clamor doctrine operates to
discount or exclude the testimony of neighboring property owners from zoning
decisions, such a holding would run contrary to the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
b.

Public Clamor as a Basis for Invalidating a Zoning Decision Has
Always Been Founded on the Concept of Improper Purpose or
Procedural Impropriety.

Public clamor as a basis for invalidating a land use decision has always
rested on an implicit finding that the decision was cover for a discriminatory
purpose, or that the governmental entity was acting in a procedurally suspect
manner. For example, in Davis County v. Clearfield City, this Court noted a lack
of any evidence to support the conditional use permit decision under review; that
the city council engaged in secret closed-door meetings to discuss the application;
and the near universal opposition to mental health treatment facilities as indicative
of an improper purpose. Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704, 711-712
(Utah App. 1988). The Court also noted that the County essentially abdicated its
role as an independent decision maker by asking for a show of hands from persons
attending the public hearing to gauge public sentiment for and against the
11

application. Id. at FN. 9. The case involved both improper purpose and serious
procedural defects.
Likewise, in Uintah Mountain RTC, LLC v. Duchesne County, 127 P.3d
1270 (Utah App. 2005) this Court again reviewed a conditional use permit for a
mental health treatment facility and, relying on Davis County, again noted that the
decision was motivated by fear of persons with mental health problems—an
improper purpose. Id. at 1277-1278. In Uintah Mountain the court also found
that the county had acted improperly in applying criteria, such as whether the
facility was economically viable, that had no foundation in the zoning code. Id. at
1275
Both Davis County and Uintah Mountain had an antecedent in City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985), another conditional use
permit decision, this time involving a home for mentally handicapped persons. In
Cleburne the United States Supreme Court held that mere negative attitudes or fear
of handicapped persons, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable
in a zoning ordinance, are not permissible grounds for denying a permit for a
handicapped group home. Id. at 448. By inquiring into the motivations of the
decision maker the court determined that the land use decision was based on fear
of the handicapped and, therefore, that it lacked a rational basis for decision. Id. at
12

450.
The guiding principal from these decisions is that a zoning decision is
improper, and the result of public clamor, where the decision rests on
discriminatory motives—prejudice against a disfavored group, which are unrelated
to the factors in an ordinance that are the proper basis for a decision. Improper
public clamor is in reality a recognition of a decision based on pretext, rather than
genuine zoning concerns. Uintah Mountain RTC 127 P.3d at 1277 (decision is
improper where the “real reason” for denial is public opposition). Thus, the
argument advanced by the Owners--that the City Council decision is deficient due
to exclusive reliance upon public comment--misapplies the foregoing authorities,
and fails to acknowledge the importance and constitutionally protected nature of
that testimony.
A proper formulation for the rule that public clamor invalidates a land use
decision must be premised on a finding that the local government: a) acted with an
improper purpose or motive unrelated to the legitimate purposes of the zoning
ordinance; or b) engaged in serious procedural irregularities which compromised
the fairness of the proceeding or its role as an independent decision maker. This
standard is entirely consistent with this Court’s prior holdings in Davis County and
Uintah Mountain, and the Supreme Court’s holding in City of Cleburne. And, the
13

standard avoids the defect inherent in a rule that precludes a local government from
relying upon constitutionally protected speech.
c.

Under the Appropriate Formulation of the Concept of Public
Clamor, the Moab Council Acted Properly to Weigh the Evidence
Focused on the Criteria of the Ordinance.

There is no evidence in this case that the Moab City Council decision is the
product of discriminatory motive or procedural irregularity. A bed and breakfast
facility is a common commercial enterprise, and not the type of facility that
typically provokes public outcry or prejudice. Bed and breakfast lodging (and
other lodging types) are permitted uses in several commercial zoning districts
within the City of Moab. See e.g. R. 0770, 0773, 0781 (Moab Municipal Code
commercial zoning districts allowing bed and breakfast and lodging facilities).
There is nothing in the record to suggest that the City acted as a result of personal
animus or for reasons unrelated to the zoning code.
Rather, the dispute here focuses on the criteria in the Moab ordinance, and
the conclusion that this use is not the right fit for the site. The rules for bed and
breakfast uses in residential areas are strict in that an applicant must show “clearly
minimal negative impacts on adjacent residential properties and neighborhoods.”
MMC § 17.09.531(9)(A)(1); R. 0722. Similarly, the general rules for conditional
uses require that the applicant show that the use is compatible with adjacent
14

existing uses, and that it does not pose unreasonable impacts in terms of such
things as noise, traffic, parking, or the like. MMC § 17.09.530(H); R. 0715
(approval conditions). All of these requirements, which focus on promoting
harmony between land uses and avoiding harm to existing uses, are legitimate
subjects for the exercise of municipal zoning power. It is not surprising that an
application may fail to meet this exacting standard due to site constraints.
Moreover, the public testimony in opposition to the application was, for the
most part, focused on these approval criteria. For example, neighbors provided
substantive comments referring to the criteria in the ordinance and noting impacts
about the lack of parking, a projected 38% increase in traffic, and vehicle noise
levels in excess of 80 decibels4. R. 0216-0219 (written comments addressed to
criteria in ordinance); 0353-0357 (testimony about noise levels and street grades)5.
Others testified to qualitative changes to the neighborhood and its traffic patterns
that would result from a new commercial use. R. 0241-0242. The testimony
offered specifics, including the observation that the use of Off Highway Vehicles,

4

The Owners failed to offer any traffic study to rebut these concerns.
Several neighbors commented on the reference in design drawings to “trailer and
secondary vehicle parking” and observed that the Owners might market their
facility to off highway vehicle enthusiasts, who would create additional impacts in
terms of noise, pollution, speed, pedestrian safety, and the like. R. 0220; 0252;
0242
5
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a common recreational activity in Moab, would likely occur at the new
development and result in noise emissions of between 75-80 decibels, a figure
which exceeds the Moab noise ordinance. R. 0218. The Record is replete with
genuine, substantive concerns about the compatibility of the proposed use with the
existing qualities of the neighborhood. See Appellants’ Opening Brief, Statement
of Facts, pp. 4-9.
While there were admittedly some neighbor comments that amounted to
unsupported opinion, these comments were more than overcome by testimony
from others that was focused on the criteria in the ordinance, and based on personal
observation of the neighborhood. The City, as land use authority, properly
weighed this testimony and concluded that the Owners had not met their burden of
proof. As the finder of fact, the Council had the duty to weigh this conflicting
evidence to determine if the Owners had satisfied the requirements of the
ordinance6. It is not this Court’s prerogative to weigh the evidence anew. Save
our Canyons v. Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake County, 116 P.3d at 983
(standard of review in appeal of adjudicative proceeding). Instead, looking at the

6

This was not a case of the local government blindly acceding to demands by the
public. The vote was 3-1 to deny the application, with one Council member
voting in favor, and another noting that the decision was a difficult call for her. R.
0371-0380; 0382-0383.
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evidence on both sides, this Court should conclude that the decision was rational
and based on a reasonable evaluation of the evidence.
5.

THE OWNERS CONCEDE THAT THE TRIAL COURT
MISAPPLIED THE STANDARD OF REVIEW AND THAT IT
IMPROPERLY ADDRESSED THE SUBJECT OF A REMAND FOR
FINDINGS.
The City brought two points of error which were not addressed by Owners in

their response brief: a) that the trial court erred in failing to order a remand for
additional findings; and b) that the court incorrectly applied the standard of review
by engaging in its own fact-finding and shifting the burden of proof to the City.
Opening Brief, pp. 23-26. Appellate courts have discretion to disregard the
position of an appellee where it fails to directly address in its brief the arguments
brought on appeal. Broderick v. Apartment Management Consultants, 279 P.3d
391, 393-394 (Utah 2012). Here, the Owners have essentially conceded points of
error number three and four brought by the City. Opening Brief, pp. 1-2.
Accordingly, this Court has discretion to accept the proffered arguments of the
City on those points. Broderick, 279 P.3d at 396.
II. CONCLUSION
The City of Moab respectfully requests that the judgment of the trial court be
reversed and that the conditional use permit that is the subject of this appeal be
17

deemed void. The City additionally requests an award of its costs in this action to
the extent permitted by law.
III. REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
The City of Moab hereby requests oral argument in this appeal.
Submitted this 6th day of September, 2016.
DUFFORD, WALDECK, MILBURN
& KROHN, LLP
By: /s/ Christopher G. McAnany
Christopher G. McAnany, #7933
Attorneys for Appellants
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